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The Plan Is To BLOW UP Entire Middle East | Interview with Trita Parsi

The Plan Is To BLOW UP Entire Middle East | Interview with Trita Parsi", "author": "Novara Media", "body": "What if the war in Iran isn't about ending a threat—but about ensuring it never ends? That's the most unsettling conclusion from a quiet but sweeping interview with Trita Parsi, executive vice president at the Quincy Institute. His assessment challenges the mainstream narrative: Israel isn't just fighting Iran, it's systematically eliminating anyone who could negotiate peace—and making sure the war drags on indefinitely.

The Strategy That Isn't Working

Israel's decapitation campaign has achieved remarkable tactical success. Iranian commanders have been killed at an unprecedented rate—Supreme Leader figureheads, military chiefs, and intelligence ministers all eliminated in rapid succession. But here's the paradox: none of this has translated into strategic victory.

"The first big one was the assassination of the supreme leader," Parsi told Novara. "It not only did not end up becoming a strategic success—it actually became a strategic failure because it led to regime consolidation rather than collapse."

When Iran assassinated Soleimani in 2020, Washington expected the Islamic Republic to fracture. Instead, the regime tightened. The base of the Islamic Republic—perhaps only 15-20% of Iranians—became energized and saw this as an existential fight. They rallied around the regime rather than abandoning it.

The same dynamic is repeating now. "You can say that look, if this goes on for a very long time and eventually there's hardly anyone left—no institutional memory—the system as a whole is broken," Parsi said. "That absolutely is a scenario that can occur. The question is how long will that take?"

Why Israel Wants the War to Continue

The interview's most controversial claim: Israel may be deliberately killing off Trump's diplomatic offramps.

"All wars end up in some form of diplomacy," Parsi argued. "This one will too. Trump is already looking for an offramp. He's seen that the Iranians are not interested in any talks about ceasefire. But the people within the Iranian system that would lead those talks—and that would be able to play the role of ensuring the system as a whole would go along with such an arrangement—are the ones being killed off."

The implication is stark: if this is deliberate, Israel is making it increasingly difficult to end the war through negotiation. From Israel's standpoint, they don't want peace. They want to continue.

"They want to degrade Iran's industrial base," Parsi explained. "They want to destroy as much as possible of the country—not of the regime, of the country—in order to make sure that whatever happens after this war, Iran will have been set back so significantly that its power simply will not be where it was before and cannot pose a challenge to Israel."

This is the "mowing the lawn" strategy—same approach used in Gaza and Lebanon. It doesn't matter who is in charge; it's about making sure the grass stays short.

The Hezbollah Paradox

One might expect Israel's campaign against Hezbollah to have permanently disabled the organization. After all, Israel killed an unprecedented number of their commanders—including the pager attacks that devastated leadership ranks.

"In Hezbollah's case, the Israelis actually took out a very large number of their commanders and blew them up through those pagers—tremendous intelligence work," Parsi acknowledged. "But now Hezbollah is back. They have completely reorganized. They've changed tactics. And Israel is facing some significant challenges in Lebanon right now."

This matters because it demonstrates that decapitation alone cannot guarantee strategic defeat. An organization—even without a state—can recover, adapt, and continue fighting.

The Gulf States Are Refusing to Join

The interview revealed a critical fracture between the US strategy and regional actors. Israel tried to drag GCC states into the war by targeting Iran's South Pars gas field—the largest gas field in the world, half of which belongs to Qatar.

"The Israelis are trying to expand the war further," Parsi said. "They want the Iranians to strike back at the GCC states. They want to drag the GCC states into this war."

But Qatar is resisting fiercely. "The Qataris are very much resisting this because they believe that at the end of that war, if they're involved in it, they're going to be forced to ally themselves with Israel—which is something they don't want to do and their populations are dead set against."

This matters for global oil markets. Iranian retaliation against Emirati and Saudi oil facilities would devastate the global economy—and both Gulf states know that threat is now active.

Trump's Political Window Is Closing

The war is already eating into Trump's political base. A recent poll showed support among Trump voters dropped roughly 10% in just two weeks—down to 76%. More than half would be very happy if Trump declared victory and ended the war immediately.

"Trump himself may not have that much time because this is starting to eat away from his base as well," Parsi noted. "He probably has a couple more weeks—two or three weeks—before this pain is becoming a main problem."

The oil price spike is already making Trump nervous. He doesn't want prices rising ahead of midterms—and Iran knows it.

The Strait of Hormuz Is Not Closed Yet

One moment worth noting: US officials assumed Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz as an existential last resort. They were wrong twice over.

"The Iranians view this as an existential fight," Parsi said. "So all of the things that were off the table before are no longer off the table."

Iran has figured out how to selectively close the strait—permitting states that give them concessions while blocking others. The Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, and Russians can pass through; everyone else is blocked. This isn't suicide—it's leverage.

Counterarguments Worth Considering

Critics might note that this analysis assumes intentionality where there may only be chaos—that Israel killing potential negotiators could simply be the natural consequence of a war without diplomatic channels, not a deliberate strategy. The distinction matters: conflating tactical kills with strategic goals can overread intent into outcomes.

"This is about making sure the lawn is as short as possible. It doesn't matter what color the lawn is or who is in charge of the lawn—it's about mowing it."

Bottom Line

The strongest insight here: Israel's war isn't a means to an end—it may be the end itself. The strategy of perpetual degradation through decapitation has no exit condition that favors peace. The weakest assumption is that Iran will collapse under pressure; instead, every assassination strengthens their narrative of existential threat and consolidates regime loyalty. Watch whether Trump can find a diplomatic offramp before his base fractures—or whether Israel succeeds in eliminating the negotiators who could make one work.", "pull_quote": ""This is about making sure the lawn is as short as possible. It doesn't matter what color the lawn is or who is in charge of the lawn—it's about mowing it."", "bottom_line": "The strongest insight here: Israel's war isn't a means to an end—it may be the end itself. The strategy of perpetual degradation through decapitation has no exit condition that favors peace. The weakest assumption is that Iran will collapse under pressure; instead, every assassination strengthens their narrative of existential threat and consolidates regime loyalty. Watch whether Trump can find a diplomatic offramp before his base fractures—or whether Israel succeeds in eliminating the negotiators who could make one work.

Deep Dives

Explore related topics with these Wikipedia articles, rewritten for enjoyable reading:

Iranians on Wednesday gathered in Thran to mourn the death of Ali Larajani. And the procession also commemorated the head of Iran's Bas volunteer paramilitary force um Golam Resza Solommani um who was killed on Tuesday. Um it also commemorated the sailors of the Denner ship who were killed by US torpedo off the coast of Sri Lanka earlier this month. Israel announced on Wednesday that they'd also killed Iran's intelligence minister Ismael Katib.

Um the New York Times has a striking map which shows um exactly who in Iran's leadership has been assassinated so far. Most of those killed were members of the defense establishment who were killed alongside Supreme Leader Ali Hami on the first day of the war. Um aside from Hami, Larajani is the most senior political leader to have been killed so far. So will this decapitation strategy against the Islamic Republic work?

And what are Israel even trying to achieve? Earlier I spoke to Tita Parci, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, an author of Losing an Enemy on Obama's nuclear deal and treacherous alliance on the history of relations between Israel and Iran. >> So the decapitation strategy by Israel and secondary by the United States has definitely uh managed to achieve some tactical successes for Israel and the United States. But so far we have not seen those tactical successes be tr translated into strategic successes.

The first big one of course was the assassination of the supreme leader. It not only did not end up becoming a strategic success, it actually became a s a strategic failure because it led to a scenario in which the Iranian system um actually coalesed converge and you also had the base of the Islamic Republic in Iran which probably is no more than 15 to 20% actually be quite energized and they see this as an existential fight. So you had major regime consolidation following this rather than what the US and Israel had hoped for which was that this would lead to regime collapse. Now Aljan is a very significant person but al obviously not as significant as as common was.

Um uh whether that will lead to collapse we see no sign of um uh whether they will be translated into strategic success again too early to tell. But what we can say, however, is that it is leading to a ...