Packy McCormick reframes the nation's bicentennial not as a nostalgic look backward, but as a stark audit of where American innovation stalled and where it must accelerate to survive the next quarter-century. The piece’s most provocative claim is that while digital life has exploded in sophistication, our ability to physically sculpt the environment—specifically through energy production—has flatlined for fifty years, creating a bottleneck that threatens future prosperity.
The Great Stagnation of Physical Reality
McCormick opens by contrasting the pre-industrial world of 1776 with today, noting that in the colonial era, "Americans alive at the signing of the Declaration of Independence worked not for fulfillment but to prevent their families' hunger." He uses this historical baseline to highlight a paradox: despite two and a half centuries of progress, we have hit a wall in the physical world. The author argues that while we mastered information, we lost our grip on energy density.
"We fell off the 'Henry Adams Curve,' on which America steadily grew usable energy by 7% per year, in the 1970s and never recovered," McCormick writes. This is a crucial pivot point for the narrative. By invoking this specific economic curve, he moves beyond vague complaints about bureaucracy to pinpoint a measurable decline in national capacity. The argument holds weight because it connects energy stagnation directly to economic outcomes: "If you look at the average personal income on a real-dollar basis post-1970... there hasn't been real wage growth per capita." This suggests that without cheap, abundant energy, the digital revolution alone cannot sustain rising living standards.
Critics might argue that efficiency gains and the shift to a service economy explain the lack of physical output growth, but McCormick counters this by noting that "there is no such thing as a prosperous low-energy country." The distinction he draws between input-takers (the 1776 model) and input-makers (the modern ideal) clarifies why simply consuming less isn't the same as building more.
The Energy Bottleneck and the Nuclear Turn
The commentary then shifts to the specific solution: nuclear power. McCormick, channeling his guest Scott Nolan's perspective, identifies a critical failure in the last twenty-five years of energy policy. "One of these is nuclear power, where we made practically no progress on nuclear energy in the past quarter century, despite nuclear having fewer emissions than solar and being statistically safer than wind." The data supports this grim assessment: between 2001 and 2023, U.S. nuclear generation increased by less than one percent.
This section gains depth when McCormick connects current energy needs to the broader trajectory of American ambition, referencing the companion deep dives on space exploration and advanced computing. He notes that if we want to "power a Mars civilization," we need nuclear reactors, just as we need them for Earth's AI data centers. The parallel is striking: the same technology required to leave our planet is the only thing capable of sustaining its digital future.
There is no monarch or dictator promising to provide. If we want the growth, prosperity, and abundance of the next 250 years to exceed those of the last 250, it's up to every one of us to keep it in the best way we see fit.
McCormick effectively uses this Ben Franklin quote to reframe the challenge from a political grievance to a civic imperative. The argument is that institutional inertia, rather than a lack of technology, is the primary enemy. He highlights how the bottleneck has shifted from building reactors to fueling them, noting that America now relies on adversaries for enriched uranium. This reframes energy independence not just as an environmental goal, but as a national security necessity.
The Human Cost of Stagnation
While the piece focuses heavily on macro-economics and engineering, it briefly touches on the human element of stagnation. McCormick reminds readers that in 1776, "the average American was most likely to die from an infectious disease" and surgery was performed without anesthesia. The contrast with today's medical capabilities—where genome sequencing costs a few hundred dollars rather than billions—is meant to inspire hope. However, the implication is clear: if we stop building, we risk sliding backward.
The author warns that "the bottleneck in nuclear energy shifted to something that the U.S. had once produced by stopped: enriched uranium." This creates a sense of urgency regarding supply chains and industrial policy. The narrative suggests that without a renewed commitment to physical infrastructure, the digital advances we celebrate will hit a hard ceiling.
Critics might note that the focus on nuclear energy overlooks the potential of other renewables or grid modernization technologies that don't require such heavy capital investment. Yet, McCormick's point about energy density remains compelling for high-load applications like AI and manufacturing, where intermittent sources struggle to compete without massive storage solutions.
Bottom Line
McCormick's strongest move is linking the stagnation of real wages directly to the stagnation of physical energy production, forcing readers to see infrastructure not as a boring policy detail but as the foundation of prosperity. The argument's vulnerability lies in its assumption that regulatory hurdles are the sole barrier, potentially underestimating the economic and safety complexities of rapid nuclear deployment. As America looks toward its next 250 years, the piece serves as a stark reminder that digital abundance cannot exist without physical power.