Claire Berlinski delivers a searing diagnosis of European strategic paralysis, arguing that the continent's inability to impose secondary sanctions on China and India is not a moral failure, but a rational response to a shattered geopolitical order. The piece's most startling claim is that the United States has effectively dismantled the very coalition and financial architecture required to enforce its own foreign policy prescriptions, leaving Europe trapped in a system where its primary leverage no longer connects to anything.
The Illusion of a Unitary Europe
Berlinski dismantles the common American assumption that the European Union operates as a single sovereign entity capable of decisive foreign action. She writes, "Americans seem to think of the EU as a unitary state, one that's capable of pursuing a state-like foreign policy. It simply isn't. It's an empty empire, with no center capable of imposing its will on the periphery." This distinction is crucial for understanding why diplomatic efforts often stall; unlike the historical Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the Hapsburgs could deploy troops to Prague to enforce will, the modern EU is a customs union requiring unanimous consent.
The author points out that this structural weakness is exploited by external actors, noting that "Hungary's alignment with China isn't just rhetorical—it's infrastructural: telecoms, battery supply chains, universities, rail corridors, police tech, something far closer to complete regulatory capture than diplomatic friendship." By treating Europe as a monolith, American analysts miss the reality that a single member state can veto actions that would otherwise be economically devastating for the bloc. Critics might argue that this view underestimates the potential for the EU to bypass unanimity in specific crisis scenarios, yet Berlinski's evidence regarding the near-collapse of the MERCOSUR treaty due to French farmer protests suggests that internal fragmentation is the dominant reality.
Treating "Europe" as if it had a unitary executive, treasury, army, and strategic culture is a category error; it has none of the four in any binding sense.
The Arithmetic of Economic Self-Evisceration
The commentary shifts to the economic calculus of secondary sanctions, challenging the notion that Europe could simply cut off China and India from Russian energy purchases. Berlinski argues that such a move would not be a surgical strike but "economic self-evisceration with no guarantee of coercive success." She explains that secondary sanctions are only effective when the enforcer controls the reserve currency, maritime insurance, and settlement systems—levers that Europe does not possess independently.
The author warns that attempting to force "Your energy policy requires Atlantic permission" in 2025 is a dangerous anachronism. "It would automatically trigger three structural consequences: Accelerated RMB/rupee trade routing outside dollar–euro rails; financial infrastructure bifurcation; and the retaliatory industrial murder of the German, French, and Italian export sectors in Asia." This analysis highlights a grim trade-off: the immediate economic pain of sanctions would likely radicalize European politics and hand a victory to the very forces Europe seeks to contain. While some might argue that the long-term strategic necessity outweighs short-term economic pain, Berlinski contends that the political cost of such a move is simply too high for European electorates to bear.
The Collapse of the Atlantic Coalition
Perhaps the most provocative element of Berlinski's argument is her assessment of the United States' role in this degradation. She posits that the tools of financial warfare worked for decades only because the West acted as a unified bloc under American leadership. "But instead of sustaining that order, we dismantled it in a fit of pique, having convinced ourselves that we were the victim, not the primary beneficiary, of the very structures from which we derived our power." The administration's actions, she suggests, have blown the coalition to smithereens, leaving Europe unable to wield instruments that Washington prescribes but no longer controls.
The text explores the disturbing consistency of policies that harm American allies while aiding Russia, questioning whether this is mere incompetence or something more calculated. Berlinski asks, "Is it possible, is it even plausible, that an administration could behave like this out of stupidity, greed, and ignorance alone?" She notes that the behavior aligns perfectly with the authoritarian blueprint of Project 2025, suggesting a deliberate dismantling of democratic guardrails. The human cost of this strategic confusion is implicit but heavy; as the author notes, large-scale sanctions "kill quietly, regress public health, destroy middle classes, and radicalize politics," creating a fertile ground for the very extremism that threatens global stability.
Europe now finds itself trapped inside a degrading system. It isn't refusing to pull a lever that could end the war; it's discovering, in real time, that the lever no longer connects to anything.
Bottom Line
Berlinski's strongest contribution is her reframing of European inaction not as cowardice, but as a rational calculation within a broken system where American hegemony has evaporated. The argument's vulnerability lies in its somewhat fatalistic view that the Atlantic coalition cannot be rebuilt, potentially underestimating the resilience of democratic institutions. However, her warning that the tools of the past no longer function in the present offers a necessary, if uncomfortable, reality check for policymakers clinging to outdated strategies.