Mick Ryan delivers a stark warning to Western defense establishments: the greatest threat to national security isn't a new weapon system, but an institutional inability to learn from the wars being fought right now. While traditional analysis fixates on hardware gaps or budget shortfalls, Ryan argues that the real deficit is cultural—a systemic refusal to question core doctrines even as battlefields evolve with terrifying speed.
The Cost of Institutional Inertia
Ryan’s central thesis rests on a chilling comparison between historical precedent and current failures. He draws a direct line from the 1932 Great Emu War, where an Australian Army unit forgot how to match force to problem in just fourteen years, to modern air bases that remain vulnerable despite clear warnings. The author writes, "Western military institutions exhibit a systemic learning deficit that prioritises exploitation of existing competencies over exploration of new solutions." This framing is powerful because it shifts the blame from a lack of resources to a failure of will.
The evidence Ryan marshals is specific and unsettling. He notes that while a Russian aircraft was attacked at the Machulishchy airbase in 2023, a similar United States Air Force E-3 Sentry aircraft was destroyed in Saudi Arabia years later, despite having "years of warning about the threat, which it did not heed." This is not merely bad luck; Ryan argues it is a structural flaw. He invokes organizational theorists Chris Argyris and Donald Schön to distinguish between "single-loop" learning—fixing errors within existing rules—and "double-loop" learning, which requires questioning the rules themselves. As Ryan puts it, "Military institutions are archetypal single-loop learners. They excel at tactical adaptation within doctrinal boundaries but can be structurally resistant to revising core doctrines."
The human cost of this bureaucratic rigidity is often invisible in high-level strategy papers, yet it is the defining factor in modern conflict. When institutions fail to adapt, the burden falls on the soldiers and civilians caught in the crossfire of outdated tactics. Ryan highlights that "choosing not to learn is a strategic decision with grave consequences," a phrase that demands we consider the lives lost because leaders preferred comfort over innovation.
The inability to rapidly implement proven innovations is a failure of organisational culture, of promotion systems that reward conformity over innovation, and of political leadership that fails to demand institutional accountability for learning.
Critics might argue that military bureaucracies are inherently slow by design to ensure stability and prevent rash actions. However, Ryan counters this by pointing out that the speed of change in modern warfare has rendered traditional caution obsolete. The argument holds weight when looking at the contrast between Western hesitation and the rapid, albeit authoritarian, learning bloc formed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
The Political Imperative for Change
The piece moves beyond military theory to address the political leadership required to break these cycles. Ryan observes that while Ukraine has successfully formalized counter-drone expertise with NATO, this process took years of informal learning before becoming policy. He writes, "Political leadership is necessary to convert battlefield lessons into funded, accountable institutional change, rather than leaving them as widely shared observations." This distinction is crucial; it suggests that without a mandate from the top, even the most obvious lessons will gather dust.
Ryan contrasts this with Japan's recent pivot, where the ruling party approved a target of producing 80,000 military drones annually by 2030. He notes that Tokyo has moved beyond observation to "institutional partnership with Ukraine," creating a Japan-Ukraine Drone Cluster to field interceptor drones immediately. Meanwhile, Taiwan faces legislative stalemates over funding, illustrating how political friction can stall adaptation even when the threat is clear. As Ryan succinctly puts it regarding the global landscape: "The nations, and the militaries, that treat adaptation as a standing obligation rather than an occasional task are the ones setting the pace of this war - and all future ones."
Interestingly, Ryan also deconstructs the myth of the monolithic authoritarian learning bloc. He points out that Russia is currently struggling with its own "single-loop pathology" in air defense, layering familiar systems onto rooftops rather than rethinking doctrine against low-cost drone threats. This nuance strengthens his argument: the ability to learn isn't determined by regime type alone, but by whether leadership demands accountability for results.
Bottom Line
Mick Ryan's most compelling contribution is identifying "responsible rebellion" as a necessary virtue for modern military leaders, challenging the culture of conformity that often stifles innovation. The argument's greatest vulnerability lies in its assumption that political will can be summoned quickly enough to counter adversaries who are already ahead; the gap may already be too wide to close without catastrophic loss. Readers should watch whether Western governments move from acknowledging these deficits to restructuring their promotion and procurement systems, or if they remain trapped in the very single-loop learning cycle Ryan so sharply critiques.