Wikipedia Deep Dive

Xi Jinping

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The caves of Liangjiahe Village tell a story that Beijing's marble halls never could. In the winter of 1969, a fifteen-year-old boy with hollowed cheeks and worn shoes trudged into a remote village in Shaanxi Province— fugitive from Mao's Revolution, son of an enemy of the state. He would spend seven years sleeping in cave dwellings, eating nothing but coarse maize bread, and applying to join the Communist Party ten times before acceptance. Four decades later, that same boy would sit behind a podium draped in red silk, addressing the nation as the most powerful person in China. This is not a story of redemption in any Western sense—it is a tale of patience, calculation, and an almost supernatural ability to survive China's chaotic politics.

The Purged Son

Xi Jinping was born on 15 June 1953 in Beijing, the third child of Xi Zhongxun—a revolutionary who commanded respect as one of the elder statesmen of the Chinese Communist Party—and his wife Qi Xin. His father held posts after 1949: head of the Party Publicity Department, vice premier, and vice chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The family lived in comfortable obscurity until Xi was ten years old.

In 1963, everything changed. Xi Zhongxun was purged from the Communist Party and dispatched to work in a factory in Luoyang, Henan. The Cultural Revolution, that tumultuous decade of ideological fervor, shattered Xi's childhood when student militants ransacked the family home. His half-sister Heping hanged herself at her military academy during the chaos. His mother was forced to publicly denounce his father—paraded before crowds as an enemy of the revolution.

The authorities imprisoned Xi Zhongxun in 1968. The boy, now fifteen, fled Beijing for Liangjiahe Village in Yan'an, Shaanxi—a region so backward it reminded him of Chairman Mao's revolutionary roots. But the rural life was unforgiving. Within months, unable to endure the hardship, young Xi escaped back to Beijing.

He was caught during a crackdown on deserters from the countryside and sent to a work camp to dig ditches. He returned to the village only after his aunt Qi Yun and uncle Wei Zhenwu persuaded him to stay. Under the pseudonym of "Liangjiahe's son," he spent seven years in those cave houses.

The Village Secretary

The Communist Party, ever suspicious of family background, initially rejected Xi Jinping's applications to join its ranks. Ten times he applied. Ten times he was denied—his father's political stigma too heavy a burden. It was only when new commune secretary recognized his capabilities that his application reached the CCP Yanchuan County Committee and was approved in early 1974.

By then, Xi had already proven himself. He was recommended to become Party branch chairman of the Liangjiahe Brigade—effectively the village leader—and he led social education efforts in neighboring Zhaojiahe Village in 1973. His effective work and strong rapport with villagers made communities desire his retention. In July that same year, after Liangjiahe advocated for his return, he went back.

In 1975, when Yanchuan County received a slot at Tsinghua University—the country's most prestigious institution—the county committee recommended Xi for admission. From 1975 to 1979, he studied chemical engineering as a worker-peasant-soldier student, that peculiar Soviet-influenced system where students combined labor with study.

He graduated in April 1979 and was assigned to the General Office of the State Council and the General Office of the CCP Central Military Commission, serving as one of three secretaries to Geng Biao—a Politburo member and Minister of Defense. The young Xi had finally entered Beijing's corridors of power.

Rising Through the Ranks

The next decades would see Xi Jinping climb China's administrative ladder with methodical precision. In March 1982, he was appointed deputy party secretary of Zhengding County in Hebei Province—together with Lü Yulan, they wrote to the central government addressing excessive requisitions that burdened local farmers.

Their efforts convinced Beijing to reduce the annual requisition amount by fourteen million kilograms. In 1983, Zhengding adjusted its agricultural structure, leading to a massive increase in farmer incomes—from 148 yuan to over 400 yuan within a year.

Then came his coastal assignments: governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, followed by governorship and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007. These coastal provinces—wealthy, market-oriented, entrepreneurial—would shape his economic worldview. He learned to balance growth with control.

In 2007, following the dismissal of Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to replace him briefly. That same year, he joined the Politburo Standing Committee—the innermost circle of Chinese power—and became first-ranking member of the Central Secretariat in October.

The Paramount Leader

By 2008, Hu Jintao designated Xi as his presumed successor—paramount leader-in-waiting. He was appointed vice president and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, positions that consolidated his authority over both party and military apparatus.

When he officially assumed power in 2012—as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the Central Military Commission—he became the first Chinese leader since Mao who did not serve as state premier or provincial party secretary before taking the top job. His path was unusual: no foundational position at the grassroots level had prepared him for this moment, yet his survival of China's treacherous political environment suggested a unique capability.

His tenure has been marked by centralization. He took multiple positions simultaneously—accumulating institutional power that would have been impossible under previous leaders. He overhauled both political and military bodies, increasing the CCP's influence over state organs.

The Iron Hand

Domestically, Xi's policies struck with force. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired officials—including former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang. The message was clear: no one is untouchable.

To promote "common prosperity," he enacted policies designed to increase equality—redistribution mechanisms that critics call regressive, supporters call essential. He oversaw targeted poverty alleviation programs as part of the battle against poverty, directing a broad crackdown in 2021 against the tech and tutoring sectors—a systematic effort to rein in private enterprise.

His support for state-owned enterprises expanded dramatically. He emphasized advanced manufacturing and technological development, advanced military-civil fusion—China's strategy for integrating civilian technology into warfare—and led reforms in China's property sector.

When COVID-19 arrived in mainland China in January 2020, he presided over a zero-COVID policy until December 2022—before shifting to mitigation after protests occurred. That policy of isolation and control defined Chinese pandemic response for three years.

The Hard Line

On foreign policy, Xi's hardline approach pursued expansion. He pursued aggressive relations with the United States—trade wars, technology restrictions, diplomatic confrontations—while maintaining the famous nine-dash line in the South China Sea, asserting territorial claims against neighbors like Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia.

He expanded China's influence in Africa and Eurasia by championing the Belt and Road Initiative—a global infrastructure program that has drawn dozens of nations into Beijing's orbit.

In Taiwan, relations deteriorated. Under President Tsai Ing-wen—successor of Ma Ying-jeou whom Xi met in 2015—he presided over a significant cooling. He pursued confrontation rather than dialogue.

In Hong Kong, 2020 saw passage of the national security law clamping down on political opposition—especially pro-democracy activists. The city that once symbolized Chinese openness to reform now fell under stricter control.

The Thought

His political ideas—"Xi Jinping Thought"—have been incorporated into party and national constitutions. They represent an ideological framework emphasizing socialism with Chinese characteristics, party supremacy, and the great rejuvenation of Chinese nationalism.

Since coming to power, his tenure has witnessed increased censorship and mass surveillance—as well as deterioration in human rights, including persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018—a constitutional change that allows him to serve indefinitely—marked a significant shift in governance philosophy.

In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary. In March 2023, he was re-elected state president for an unprecedented third term. The boy from Liangjiahe's cave houses had become the ruler of 1.4 billion people—and his story has not ended yet.